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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Maurice Anthony Staples appeals from the district court's orders
relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of the
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea
to felony domestic battery.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While arguing with his fiancee, Patsy Garcilazo, about allegations that he
was cheating on her, Staples twisted Patsy's wrist and pushed her over a couch,
causing her to hit her head on a coffee table.

(5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic

Battery Eval., pp.4-5.) Patsy followed Staples outside and asked him to return
her house keys.

(5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.3, 5.) Staples

responded by grabbing Patsy's neck, strangling her and throwing her to the
ground. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.3-5.) Patsy got up, took
Staples' keys and ran inside her apartment. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery
Eval., p.5.) Staples followed Patsy and again pushed her over the couch, then
held a knife to her throat and threatened to kill her. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic
Battery Eval., pp.5, 12-13.)

Staples then left the apartment, but not before

kicking and breaking the door. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.46.) Patsy's five-year-old daughter was present when Staples threatened Patsy
with the knife, and she saw Staples kick in the door. (Domestic Battery Eva I.,
pp.5-7.)
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The state charged Staples with attempted strangulation, aggravated
assault, domestic assault in the presence of a child and malicious injury to
property. (R., pp.35-37.) Pursuant to plea agreement, the state amended the
first count of the information to charge domestic battery with traumatic injury
(felony domestic battery).

(R., pp.65-66, 69-71.)

Staples pied guilty to that

charge and the state dismissed remaining counts. (R., pp.65-67, 90.) The court
imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction.

(R., pp.88-94.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the

district court suspended the balance of Staples' sentence and placed him on
probation for nine years. (R., pp.104-09, 111-18.)
Less than nine months later, in December 2009, Staples' probation officer
prepared a report of violation, alleging that Staples had violated the terms and
conditions of his probation by being removed from New Directions Aftercare for
failing to attend required sessions, failing to enroll in a court-ordered domestic
violence treatment program, being cited for driving without privileges in
September 2009, failing to pay the costs of supervision, and changing
residences without permission and without notifying his probation officer of his
whereabouts in November 2009. (R., pp.137-40; see also R., pp.119-20 (Motion
For Warrant For Probation Violation, filed Feb. 1, 2010).) Staples admitted to
having violated his probation by being removed from New Directions Aftercare,
failing to enroll in domestic violence treatment, and changing residences without
permission, and the state dismissed the remaining allegations. (R., pp.144-45.)
The district court revoked Staples' probation, ordered the underlying sentence
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executed and retained jurisdiction a second time.
conclusion

of the second

retained jurisdiction

(R., pp.147-52.)
period,

At the

the district court

relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Staples' sentence executed. (R., pp.15862.) Staples filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the
district court denied. (R., pp.163-65, 180-83.) Staples filed a notice of appeal
timely only from the court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule
35 motion. (R., pp.166-69, 186-89.)
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ISSUES
Staples states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Staples due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Staples' I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency in light of new
information indicating that his family is in need of his
financial support?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Staples failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Has Staples failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion,
either by relinquishing jurisdiction or by denying Staples' Rule 35 motion
for reduction of the sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to felony
domestic battery?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

Staples Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With Irrelevant Transcripts

A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Staples filed a motion to augment

with various items, including as-yet prepared transcripts of the April 19, 2010
hearing at which Staples admitted to having violated his probation and the
August 2, 2010 disposition hearing at which the district court revoked Staples'
probation and ordered a second period of retained jurisdiction.

(Motion To

Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support
Thereof (hereinafter "Motion To Augment"), filed July 14, 2011.

1
)

The Idaho

Supreme Court denied Staples' motion to augment with the requested transcripts
but granted the motion insofar as it sought augmentation of the record with
documentary evidence submitted in connection with Staples' sentencing and his
Rule 35 motion. (Order Augmenting The Record, filed September 6, 2011.)
Staples now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the
appellate record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has
effectively denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

1

(Appellant's

Staples filed a timely objection to the record in the district court (see Objection
To The Record, filed June 9, 2011), but he withdrew that objection to pursue a
determination by the Idaho Supreme Court whether the requested transcripts
were necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal (see Motion For Leave
To Withdraw Objection To The Record And Vacate Hearing, filed July 6, 2011;
Motion To Augment, p.2).
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brief, pp.4-13.) Staples has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional
rights, however, because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts (of
hearings held in connection with a prior probation violation) are even relevant to,
much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court has
jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Staples Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentations
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state,
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495;

also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112

n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial

6

record that are germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations
omitted)); Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the
record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the
record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615,
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho
148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93
(1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Staples "must present something more than
gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v.
Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Staples has failed to carry this burden.
Staples' appeal is timely only from the district court's January 10, 2011
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction (R., pp.160-62), and its April 4, 2011 order
denying Staples' Rule 35 motion (R., p.182).

Staples argues that the Idaho

Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his
motion to augment the appellate record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of his
April 2010 admit/deny hearing and his August 2010 disposition hearing
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-13), but he has failed to explain, much less demonstrate,
how transcripts of those hearings are necessary to decide the only issues over
which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no evidence that the
district court had such transcripts either when it relinquished jurisdiction in
January 2011 or when it denied Staples' Rule 35 motion in April 2011, nor is
there any indication that the court relied upon anything said at the previous
hearings as a basis for its decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and deny Rule 35
relief.

Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to the
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district court in relation to the jurisdictional review and Rule 35 proceedings, they
were never part of the record before the district court and are not properly
considered for the first time on appeaL See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,
376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the
issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the record
made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never before the trial
court");

also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80,896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App.

1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and
consider new evidence.").

In short, Staples has failed to show how the

requested transcripts of hearings held in connection with the disposition of his
prior probation violations are relevant to any issue arising from the subsequent
relinquishment of jurisdiction and the denial of Rule 35 relief, the only issues over
which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal.
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Staples
(Appellant's brief, p.10), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into
execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons
why Hanington does not support Staples' claim of entitlement to the requested
transcripts.

First, Staples' appeal is not timely from the district court's August

2010 order revoking his probation and, as such, Staples cannot directly
challenge the sentence that was ordered into execution following the period of
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probation.

Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the

proposition that a merits-based review of a trial court's decision to order a
sentence executed following either a period of probation or a period of retained
jurisdiction requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of
transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the contrary,
the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was presented
at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching
its decision to revoke probation or relinquish jurisdiction, an appellant is not
entitled to transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the
date probation was finally revoked or jurisdiction was relinquished. Mayer v. City
of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds
unnecessarily" where "part or all of the stenographic transcript ... will not be
germane to consideration of the appeal" (citation and internal quotations
omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 ("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may
choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the
transcripts does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what
is unnecessary for adequate appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at
462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 (indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35
motion not entitled to transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which
no evidence was presented).
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review a trial court's
decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and deny Rule 35 relief, Staples has failed to
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show that any such circumstances apply here.

Staples has failed to point to

anything in the record that would indicate that what happened at the April 2010
admit/deny hearing and the August 2010 disposition hearing was considered or
played any role in the court's decisions in January and April 2011, respectively,
to relinquish jurisdiction and deny Staples' Rule 35 motion for reduction of his
underlying sentence. As such, Staples has failed to show that such transcripts
are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Staples claims that
he is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or
"items" to complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove
that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief,
p.9.) He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the
state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or

frivolous."

(Appellant's brief, p.6; see also p.4 ("The only way a state can

constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript
is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) No
reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

kl at

190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
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verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

1st at

191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

1st

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record

where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would
be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

1st at

195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

kl

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

1st at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

1st at 194-95.

also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
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the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the proceedings challenged on appeal are the relinquishment of
jurisdiction and the denial of Staples' Rule 35 motion in April and August 2011,
respectively.

The record related to the district court's decisions is already

complete because all of the evidence considered by the district court is before
the appellate court.

(See, ~ . 5/29/08 PSI; 6/3/08 Domestic Battery Eval.;

10/3/08 Mental Health Report; 2/25/09 APSI (prepared after first rider); R.,
pp.137-40 (12/29/09 Report Of Probation Violation); 7/12/10 PSI (updated PSI
prepared in connection with probation violation proceedings); State's Exhibit A
(letter from Staples to victim - only evidence presented at 8/2/10 probation
violation disposition hearing (R., pp.147-148)); 11/12/10 APSI (prepared after
second rider).)

It is Staples' appellate burden to establish that the requested

transcripts are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the
court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion.

The

augmentations he sought, however, were of never before prepared transcripts of
hearings held several months before the district court rendered the decisions that
are at issue in this case. Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested
transcripts (or anything contained therein) were before the district court in
relation to the jurisdictional review and Rule 35 proceedings. Because Staples
failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested
transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before
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the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate
review, and Staples has failed to establish a violation of his due process rights.2
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Staples has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection.
Staples cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-11 (citing, ~ .
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the
record that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Staples'
request for transcripts solely because he is indigent.

In fact, Staples' motion

would have properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the
transcripts. The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation
to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.AR. 30.
Staples' motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden,
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even
helpful in addressing appellate issues.

2

The Idaho Supreme Court's order

As a component of his due process claim, Staples argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.)
Because, for the reasons already explained, Staples has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the
district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion,
there is no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived
Staples of effective assistance of counsel on this appeal.
13

properly denied the motion to augment because Staples failed to make a
showing that any appellant

indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to

augment the record as requested.

There is no reason to believe that the motion

to augment would have been granted had Staples been paying for the requested
transcripts; the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent.
Staples has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the
record amply demonstrates that Staples' motion to augment was properly denied
because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for
adequate review of the district court's decisions to relinquish jurisdiction and
deny Staples' Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentence. Because Staples
has failed to show his due process and equal protection rights were implicated,
much less violated, by the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show
any basis for relief.

11.
Staples Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
After Staples pied guilty to felony domestic battery, the district court

imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction.

(R., pp.88-94.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the

district court gave Staples the opportunity for probation (R, pp.104-09, 111-18),
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but Staples squandered that opportunity within a matter of months by failing to
attend required aftercare and domestic violence treatment programs and
changing residences without notifying his probation officer, thus preventing his
probation officer from supervising him for at least two months (R., pp.119-20,
137-40, 144-45; 7/12/10 PSI, pp.1-2, 5-6).

Despite Staples' demonstrated

unwillingness or inability to comply with the terms of probation, or even to be
supervised at all, the district court exercised leniency and retained jurisdiction a
second time, thereby giving Staples a second opportunity to prove he was
amenable to community supervision.

(R., pp.147-52.)

Rather than take

advantage of that opportunity, Staples "consistently failed to program during his
entire time at NICI," leading to a recommendation that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction.

(11/12/10

APSI,

p.5.)

The

district

court

followed

that

recommendation and relinquished jurisdiction, concluding that Staples was "not
ready for probation."

(1/3/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23; R., pp.158-62.)

The court

thereafter denied Staples' Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.16365, 180-83.)
On appeal Staples argues that "[t]he district court's reliance on the APSl's
relinquishment recommendation constituted error because it did not accurately
reflect his performance while on his second rider." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) He
also challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion, contending the fixed portion of
his sentence "is excessively harsh when it is viewed in light of [both] the new
information" he provided with his motion and "the other mitigating factors" he
claims are present in his case. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Staples has failed to
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establish an abuse of discretion.

A review of the record supports the district

court's determination, following the second period of retained jurisdiction, that
Staples was not an appropriate candidate for probation, and Staples failed to
present any new evidence entitling him to a reduction of his underlying sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Staples Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse
of that discretion.

See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10

(1981 ); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App.
1990). A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).
Contrary to Staples' assertions on appeal, a review of the record in this case
supports the district court's determination that Staples was not a suitable
candidate for probation, particularly in light of Staples' history of violent behavior,
his failures to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities and his abysmal
performance during his second period of retained jurisdiction.
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Staples is a violent individual. He was convicted of battery in 2005 and of
carrying a concealed weapon in 2006. (5/29/08 PSI, p.4; 7/12/10 PSI, pp.3-4;
Domestic Battery Eval., p.4.)

Between November 2006 and July 2007, law

enforcement responded on at least four separate occasions to reports of
"Possible Domestic Disputes" between Staples and his then fiancee, Patsy
Garcilazo. (5/29/08 PSI, pp.4-5; Domestic Battery Eval., pp.14-16.) As noted by
the presentence investigator, "[a]rguments, pushing, name-calling and yelling
[were] the common theme" of these calls. (5/29/08 PSI, pp.4-5.) The level of
violence escalated significantly in December 2007, when Staples committed the
instant offense.

Specifically, after Patsy accused Staples of cheating on her,

Staples shoved her over a couch, strangled her, threw her to the ground, held a
knife to her throat and threatened to kill her. (5/29/08 PSI, p.2; Domestic Battery
Eval., pp.3-6, 12-13.)

Immediately thereafter, Staples picked up the juvenile

female with whom Patsy had accused him of cheating and drove her to a friend's
house where they hid from authorities for the next several days.

(Domestic

Battery Eval., pp.7, 11.) In an interview with police following his arrest, Staples
claimed to have "blacked out" during the most recent incident with Patsy, but he
"confessed to pushing her by her neck with one hand to get her to let go of him"
and to threatening her with a kitchen knife. (Domestic Battery Eval., pp.12-13.)
When asked why he did not hurt Patsy with the knife, Staples replied, "Heart.
Her daughter was there." (Domestic Battery Eval., p.12.)
In both a Domestic Battery Evaluation and Mental Health Report prepared
for sentencing, two separate evaluators opined that Staples minimized the extent
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of both his assaultive behaviors and his anger problems.
Eval., pp.19-20; Mental Health Report, p.2.)

(Domestic Battery

The domestic battery evaluator

characterized Staples as having "narcissistic traits," "poor control of over
aggressive impulses," and a tendency to "overreact in proportion to perceived
provocation."

(Domestic Battery Eval., p.20.)

The mental health evaluator

likewise opined that Staples had poor insight and "problems managing anger and
personality disorder issues."

(Mental Health Report, pp. 2, 5; see also p.1

(Staples' "impairment is the result of anger management problems and
personality problems").)

The domestic battery evaluator classified Staples as

posing a "medium to high risk" to commit future acts of violence.
Battery Eval., p.19.)

(Domestic

Contributing to this risk assessment were the facts that

Staples "express[ed] little remorse" for his conduct, did "not appear motivated for
treatment" and did "not believe he had a problem with anger management or
domestic violence," despite his involvement in documented "recurrent episodes
of domestic violence."

(Domestic Battery Eval., p.19.)

The mental health

evaluator also assessed Staples as posing a "moderate risk" to reoffend, noting
that "[w]ithout treatment especially in the area of anger management he is at risk
of harming someone and ending up in Court system again."

(Mental Health

Report, p.5.)
After reviewing the Domestic Battery Evaluation and Mental Health
Report, the district court struck a balance between the need to protect society
and the goal of rehabilitation by retaining jurisdiction and recommending that
Staples receive anger management and cognitive based programming.
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(R.,

pp.91-92.) Staples participated in and satisfactorily completed several courses,
including "A New Direction," Stress Management and Anger Management, during
his first period of retained jurisdiction, but not without incident. (2/25/09 APSI,
pp.1-4.) The staff and NICI noted that "Staples received a total of one alternative
sanction, four written warnings, and four verbal warnings" during his time at NICI,
and that "[a]t least four of these corrective actions involved 'anger' in one form or
another."

(2/25/09 APSI, p.3.)

Despite these disciplinary issues, Staples

received a recommendation for probation following his first period of retained
jurisdiction, but with the express caveat that he "continue anger management
through a domestic violence class" upon his release. (2/24/09 APSI, p.6.)
Consistent with NICl's recommendation, the district court placed Staples
on probation with the requirement that he participate in all rehabilitative programs
recommended by his probation officer, including anger management.

(R.,

pp.104-09, 111-18.) Staples immediately violated the conditions of his probation
by failing enroll in a 52- week domestic violence treatment program and by being
removed from "New Directions Aftercare" for non-attendance.

(R., pp.137-39.)

He also absconded supervision.

probation officer

(R., pp.137-39.)

Staples'

recommended that Staples' sentence be executed, reporting:
"Mr. Staples was a difficult case to supervise, as he made
no consistent effort to stay in contact with his probation officers.
He never reported an employer to us. He missed scheduled
appointments with me, and when he did finally report for a
scheduled appointment in September 2009, he drove to my office
without a license and was again cited for DWP. This, however,
was not his only law enforcement contact, he reported at least two
other times of being in a car with a friend who was pulled over.
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Mr. Staples never began his Domestic Violence class, but
began engaging in a romantic relationship, without permission of
his probation officers.
Further, he failed his New Directions
aftercare course, for failure to attend, which was offered to him,
free of cost at the probation office.
He then absconded in November 2009, having spent 7
months on supervision, but only having 3 face to face contact[s]
with his probation officer ....

Mr. Staples was given the opportunity of a period of retained
jurisdiction followed by probation. However, he has shown that left
to his own devises, Mr. Staples continues to associate with persons
involved in illegal activity, continues to drive without privileges, and
failed to show motivation to gain employment or attend treatment,
even when offered to him free of cost. His consistent lack of
progress and overall inability to follow any of the requirements of
society and the court order, lead me to recommend a period of
incarceration.
During this time he would be able to attend
treatment such as cognitive self change."
(7/12/10 PSI, pp.5-6.)

The presentence investigator concurred with the

probation officer's assessment, stating, "I do not feel Mr. Staples would be
successful in the community as he does not have stable residence, employment,
and the desire to comply with the terms of his probation." (7 /12/10 PSI, p.11.)
Despite Staples' demonstrated unwillingness or inability to comply with the
terms of probation, and despite the probation officer's and presentence
investigator's recommendations for incarceration, the district court exercised
leniency in retaining jurisdiction a second time to afford Staples the opportunity
to prove his amenability to community supervision.

(R., pp.147-52.)

Staples

utterly failed to take advantage of that opportunity, however, as he failed to
complete three of the four programs in which he was enrolled, including anger
management, and consistently "demonstrated himself as unwilling to correct his
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criminal thinking or to follow up on treatment that would help him correct it."
(11/12/10 APSI, pp.1, 3-5.) He amassed several informal sanctions during his
second period of retained jurisdiction and, according to NICI staff, "displayed a
significant deficit when it comes to showing an ability to learn from previous
problems." (11/12/10 APSI, pp.2-3.) He walked out of class, had missing and
incomplete assignments, "was not willing to participate in the group discussions"
or "process sessions," and spent the "majority" of his class time "not engaged
and appeared to be sleeping on occasion." (11/12/10 APSI, pp.2-3.) Staples
"completed his Personal Life Portfolio and received a positive review in his work
area."

(11/12/10 APSI, p.5.)

NICI staff determined, however, that those

accomplishments did not outweigh Staples' "negative behavior" and his
consistent, willful failure to program.

(11/12/10 APSI, pp.3-5.)

Ultimately, the

staff concluded that Staples did "not demonstrate[] the necessary skills to
facilitate his successful return to his community" and was "not an appropriate
candidate for probation." (11/12/10 APSI, p.3.) In light of this information, the
district court acted well within its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.
Staples argues on appeal that the district court erred in relying on the
information contained in the APSI as the basis for its decision to relinquish
jurisdiction, contending that the APSI "did not accurately reflect his performance
while on his second rider."

(Appellant's brief, p.15.)

Although given the

opportunity, Staples did not submit a written statement in conjunction with or in
response to the information contained in the APSI. (See 11/12/10 APSI, p.5.)
He testified at the jurisdictional review hearing that some of his failure to program
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was due to an issue with his contact lenses.

(1/3/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-13.)

As

acknowledged by Staples on appeal, however, he specifically told NICI staff
about the contact lens issue, and that information was contained in the APSI.
(11/12/10 APSI, p.2.)

That Staples believes the district court should have

assigned more weight to that information does not render the APSl's portrayal of
Staples' performance during his second period of retained jurisdiction inaccurate.
The only other information pointed to by Staples to support his claim of
inaccuracy in the APSI is his testimony that he performed several hours of
community service that went unnoted by NICI staff in recommending to the court
that it relinquish jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, p.16; 1/3/11 Tr., p.9, L.17 - p.10,
L.2.)

A log of Staples' community service hours is contained in the APSI,

however (see NICI Community Service Hours log, attached to 11/12/10 APSI),
as is an express recognition by NICI staff that Staples performed well and
"received a positive review in his work area" (11/12/10 APSI, pp.4-5). Again, that
the district court (and NICI staff) found that Staples' negative behavior and failure
to program outweighed any positive strides he made during his second period of
retained jurisdiction does not show that the information contained in the APSI
was inaccurate.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Staples was not an appropriate candidate for community
supervision. This conclusion is supported by Staples' history of violent behavior,
the risk he presents to the community, and his continued resistance to treatment.
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Given any reasonable view of the facts, Staples has failed to establish that the
district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.

D.

Staples Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Sentence
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

Staples did not appeal his underlying sentence.

Therefore, to prevail on his claim that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion, Staples must "show that the sentence. is excessive
in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court
in support of the Rule 35 motion." l_Q_,_; see also State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514,
516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008) (absent the presentation of new evidence, an
appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review
the underlying sentence). Staples has failed to satisfy his burden.
The only "new" information Staples submitted in support of his Rule 35
motion were his unsubstantiated assertions that the "mother of [his] children" had
rheumatoid arthritis and needed help taking care of the kids; he planned to take
and finish "more" anger management, domestic violence and parenting classes;
and he had guaranteed employment at two restaurants in his community. (R.,
p.164; 3/21/11 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.5, p.14, Ls.10-16.) The district court
considered this information and rejected it as a basis for reducing Staples'
sentence, noting that Staples had "been given multiple opportunities, including
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two riders" and a period of probation, and had failed to take advantage of the
treatment opportunities offered to him.

(3/21/11 Tr., p.14, L.21 -p.15, L.23.)

The court noted, "[T]he fundamental issue remains the same; that he's not
completed the domestic violence and anger management that he needs to do.
And he didn't do well on the last rider where I would have thought he would have
given every possible effort given what he was faced with." (3/21/11 Tr., p.15,
Ls.6-12.)

The district court's concern regarding Staples' failure to take

advantage of treatment opportunities was well-founded, particularly since, as
pointed out by the prosecutor, "the mother of [Staples'] children" referred to by
Staples in his Rule 35 motion, is the victim in this case and is the same individual
with whom Staples has a history of domestic violence and no contact order
violations. (See3/21/11 Tr., p.12, L.15-p.13, L.4.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Staples failed to show through his "new" information that his
sentence was excessive. Staples has failed to establish that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

24

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Staples' Rule 35 motion for
reduction of sentence.
DATED this 2 nd day of April 2012.
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